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CHAPTER3

"Putting on the Neighbor"
The Ciceronian Impulse in Luther's Christian
Approach to Practical Reason
Gary M. Simpson

Everyone sho11!d "p11t 011" his neighbor and so cond11ct himself to1vard him
as if he himself n;ere in the other's place. 1
Cicem J1Jas the 1vz'sest man. 2
What has long been noticed but little analyzed is Luther's relationship with his
"beloved Cicero," as one interpreter has again recently remarked. 3 I will explore a
key feah1re of Cicero's relationship with his philosophical predecessors in order
to highlight one reason for Luther's love affair with this "wisest man." The
twinkle in Luther's eye makes good sense when we consider Cicero's peculiar
wisdom within the context of Luther's christological formulation of Christian
love as "putting on" one's neighbor. In particular, Cicero's innovation in the
Greek rhetorical tradition provided Luther with a kind of philosophical venture
capital for his christologically tinged approach to practical reason.

Faith and Practical Reason
Luther's "The Preedom of a Christian" remains a mother lode for the intricate
and richly textured relationships of faith, love, and practical reason, which were
much contested in Luther's day and before, as in our own:1 Indeed, in the very
last paragraph he summarizes the predicament that confronts practical reason 5 or
"natural reason," as he calls it there. 6 \'{/hen the ubiquitous questions of our moral
life arise, practical reason becomes "superstitious." That is, practical reason erroneously presumes the quite commonly held "opinion," which moreover is
"trained and confirmed ... by the practice of all earthly lawgivers," that its calling
is to lead us toward righteousness in God's sight, toward justification. 7 Luther
sought to emancipate practical reason from such "false opinions concerning
works, that is, from the foolish presumption that justification is acquired by
works" 8 by having us "theodidacti, that is, those taught by God Uohn 6:45]." 9
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In Luther's Lect11res 011 Ga/atit111s (1531, 1536), he promulgates the first commandment of his theology, so to speak: ne co1!fi111dt1l11r mores etfides ("let not morality and faith be confounded")-"both are necessary, but both must be kept
within their limits." As he notes in a 1522 sermon:
[I]t is necessary to make a distinction between God and
men, between spiritual and temporal things. In human affairs man's judgment suffices. For these things, he needs no
light but that of reason .... 13ut in divine things, the things
concerning God, and in which we must conduct ourselves
acceptably with him and must secure [eternal! happiness for
ourselves, human nature is absolutely blind, staring stoncblind, unable to recognize in the slightest degree what these
things are. 10
Luther emphasizes that this distinction between the passive righteousness of
faith and the active righteousness of love and reason is "easy to speak of," but "in
experience and practice it is the most difficult of all, even if you exercise and
practice it diligently." 11 \X/hen reason trespasses its terrestrial limits, aspiring to
occupy the throne in matters of salvation, Luther's rhetoric is unsparing. Reason,
so enthroned, transmogrifies into "the lovely whore," the "arch-prostitute," "the
Devil's whore," and the "Devil's bridc." 12 For this reason, exclaims Luther
in his "Disputation against Scholastic Theology," "Virtually the entire [Nicomachecm] Ethics of Aristotle is the worst enemy of grace. This in opposition
to the scholastics." 13
As we will see, a Ciceronian form of practical reason, when-like loveformed by faith in Christ, can render a salutary service to the Christian love of
neighbor. 14 Practical reason, when formed by faith, shares characteristics akin to
Luther's famous "reason illumined by faith" that grasps the beauty and joy of that
"fortunate exchange," 15 which "couples Christ and me more intimately than a
husband is coupled to his wifc." 16 Herc we encounter forms of "another reason,"
of an emancipated reason that Luther calls "the reason of faith." 17 The purpose,
therefore, of the Christian vocation to rightly distinguish faith and reason in experience and practice is so that in everyday life they might be rightly related and
coordinated. Cicero's oratorical model of practical reason made it a ready candidate for such coordination. Before turning to it we will attend briefly to Luther's
cruciform communion Christology and its ramifications for the relationship of
faith and good works of neighbor love.
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"Putting On" the Neighbor
Luther sought to reestablish the relationship between faith and love and thus to
undo the distorted relationship that had come to dominate medieval piety expressed theologically in Aquinas's formula, "faith formed by love." Luther
claimed, to put it briefly, that Christian living is doubly ecstatic. Christians live
"beyond" themselves in a twofold way: "a Christian lives not in himself, but in
Christ and in his neighbor.... He lives in Christ through faith, in his neighbor
through love." 18 Faith, whose form is Christ himself, 19 is our all-sufficient
sociality in relationship with God, and love is our all-sufficient sociality in relationship with neighbors. 20 Indeed, it is the sufficiency of faith in Christ, this "living 'spring of water welling up to eternal life' Uohn 4:14]," 21 that begets love's
sufficiency in relationship with neighbors. Because "every good tree produces
good fruit" [Matt. 7:17], 22 therefore, "[!Jove is true and genuine where there
is true and genuine faith." 23
Christian love entails that "the good things we have from God should flow
from one to the other and be common to all." 2·1 In this earthly commonwealth
formed by love, the explicit focus lies on "what I see is necessary, profitable, and
salutary to my neighbor." 25 While love, overflowing from faith, provides the willing spontaneity to meet the neighbors' and their neighborhoods' needs, it does
not yet by itself provide the moral epistemology, so to speak, for how one discerns these needs and what will meet them. Historically, such discernment is the
calling, service, and capacities that practical reason provides for love, provisions
of which Luther is quite aware. 26
Luther employs the oft-used biblical, and Pauline, metaphor of "put on," as
with clothing, relative to our neighbors. Indeed, we "put on" Christ (Rom. 13:14)
in our baptisms (Gal. 3:27) because in Luther's cruciform sociality Christ has "so
'put on' us and acted for us as if he had been what we are," 27 that is, sufferers and
sinners. 28 More so yet, Christ's putting on sufferers and sinners furnishes both
the possibility and the form of a Christian's putting on one's neighbor "as if he
himself were in the other's place."29 We become "Christ to my neighbor," "Christ
to the other," "Christs to one another" 30 by putting on their life-world, sharing
their place, attending to their needs from within their situation. Here Luther's
exploration of cruciform communion Christology emits a moral epistemological
imagination, so to speak, for practical reason.

The Love Affair with Cicero
Luther had high regard for "worldly wisdom" relative to the moral life. 31 God
"writes it [God's moral wisdom and law] upon the hearts of all human beings
... [and] from this natural knowledge have originated all the books of the

34

THE DEVIL'S Wl!ORE

more sensible philosophers, such as Aesop, Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon,
Cicero, and C:ato." 32 Indeed, God
is a gentle and wealthy Lord. Ile casts much gold, silver, wealth,
dominions, and kingdoms among the godless, as though it were
chaff or sand. Thus he casts great intelligence, wisdom, languages, and oratorical ability among them, too, so that His dear
Christians look like mere children, fools, and beggars by comparison.33
In his L~ct11res 011 Genesis, Luther also reveals his own preference for worldly
wisdom: "Let the older ones learn Cicero, to whom, to my surprise, some prefer
Aristotle as a teacher of morals." 31 Already in his first appointment at the Uniyersity of Wittenberg (October, 1508-March, 1509) he had lectured four hours a day
on Aristotle's Nico111ac/Jea11 Et/Jics for a course on moral theology. He always held
Book 5-justicc and epieikeia-and Book 6-prudcncc-of Nico111ac/Jea11 Ethics in
high regard, but he still considered Cicero "supreme in human wisdom." 35 "Aristotle's [Nico111ac/Jea11] Et/Jics is fair," he confessed, "but Cicero's q/}ices I011 D11ties] is
better." 36 It is no accident, then, that even in his last preserved written words
Luther cites Cicero.37 Herc we will examine one aspect of Cicero's work-there
arc others-that endeared him to Luther: oratory and civic life.

Oratory and Civic Life
The first Ciceronian impulse for Luther's approach to practical reason resides in
the civic vocation of Cicero's innovative understanding of rhetoric. Here we will
probe three facets of Ciceronian rhetoric that arc crucial (there arc others): the
bond of wisdom and ekKJUcncc, the vocation of oratory in civic life, and the relationship between oratory and consent. Cicero took on the dispute between Plato
and the sophists who both, though from opposite points of view, held to the
incompatibility of philosophy, reason, and wisdom, on the one hand, and rhetoric, on the other. Prom his earliest reflections as a twenty-year-old or so to his last
book written in the year that he died, Cicero sought to heal the breach inherited
from the Greeks between philosophy and rhetoric, between reason and speech,
between wisdom and eloquence. This was an artificial, indeed illusory breach, he
argued, that undermined his own lifelong aspirations for a republican basis of
society. "Wisdom witl1out eloquence leads to very little of value for civic bodies,
while eloquence without wisdom for the most part performs in an excessive fashion
and leads to nothing," he claims in 011 [111•e11tirm. 38 In 011 /)11/ies he argues:
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13ut it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the
principles of fellowship and society that Nature has established
among men. The first principle is that which is found in the
connection subsisting between all the members of the human
race; and that bond of connection is reason and speech, which
by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating,
discussing, and reasoning associate men together and unite them
in a sort of natural fraternity. In no other particular are we farther removed from the nature of beasts. 39
Cicero was "the wisest man" precisely because, as Luther himself emphasized in 1532, he combined "wisdom and eloquence."•to Luther was keen on this
Ciceronian innovation to bring about not only a measure of "natural fraternity,"
which is the task of practical reason, but also to bolster Luther's waning though
still hopeful yearnings for reform of the church. Por instance, in his introductory
remarks to Erasmus in Tbe llondage qft/Je 11:711! (1525) he goes so far as to employ
the Ciceronian innovation. Luther would bring his gift of wisdom to the debate
and bear Erasmus's "ignorance," and he pleaded that Erasmus would bear Luther's "lack of eloquence" by bringing his gift of it, in order "to render mutual
service with our gifts, so that each with his own gift bears the burden and need of
the other [Gal. 6:2]."•ll During the weeks leading up to the Diet of Augsburg
(1530), Luther urged political authorities to excel in the virtue of peacemaking
with its benefits "so eloquent and so wise." 42 On another, very different occasion,
Luther, directly inspired by Cicero, raved that we come to trust Jesus because he
alone is "the wisest among the sons of men" endowed with "the sweetest and
loveliest lips," with "the loveliest mouth," "pleasant lips," indeed "superabundant
in His lips" out of which "gushes forth ... the sweetest and loveliest wisdom ...
sweet and delightful wisdom, worthy of such high praise." 43
Luther's initial affection for Cicero commenced because of the "bond" that
Cicero had forged between wisdom and eloquence. Luther's love intensified because Cicero understood oratory itself to be nothing less than wisdom and eloquence brought to bear on civic life for its well-being, and, from Luther's
theological perspective as well, brought to bear on ecclesial life for its communion and salvation. Indeed, Cicero had argued that it was oratory itself that originally actualized human sociality and furthermore that it is only continual oratory
that can sustain and strengthen civic life in its various dimensions. In this way
oratory is itself the key mode of practical reason. The implications of Cicero's
argument for Luther and his times were enormous and are routinely underestimated or even overlooked altogether.
Briefly stated, nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians of political philosophy have generally juxtaposed two dichotomous medieval and Reformation
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lines of thought relative to human sociality, and theologians have usually followed
this consensus. Augustine set forth the first line of thought, epitomized in his
well-known statement: "Por there is nothing so social by nature, so anti-social by
sin, as man."·11 \Vithin the earthly city, humanity's fallen, perverted, sinful nature
made anything but discord and strife hardly imaginable yet alone achievable. At
best God instituted political authority as a negative counterforce to our fallen
nature, with the task to bridle human corruption and to compel obedience to its
order of coerced tram1uility. Human sociality hardly crosses the threshold into the
postlapsarian era, perhaps not at all. Aristotle fathered the second line of thought,
according to this historical reconstruction, which Thomas Aquinas and his followers supposedly adopted wholeheartedly. Nature constitutes human beings as
political animals and endows us with an internal telos whereby our natural inclinations and tendencies organically, directly, and inexorably lead to positive family,
civic, and political structures and institutions. Robust notions of sin, or its philosophical equivalents, do not figure prominently in Aristotle's equation, save perhaps in a weak privational fashion: 15 Political historians, and theologians as well,
have routinely placed Luther prominently and exclusively within the Augustinian
line of "pure pcssimism."·16
Cicero, however, represents a third, clearly distinguishable, and readily available tradition from which Luther himself drcw:17 In Cicero's account of the origins of human sociality, Nature originally endowed humans with the potentiality
for sociability residing in their capacities for reason and speech. This potentiality,
however, stayed dormant, leaving human primordial existence scattered, savage,
brutish, and devoid of morality, law, and civic associations. \Vhat humans needed
and what emerged was a first orator who "transformed them [primordial humans]
from wild beasts and savages into tame and gentle creatures on account of heeding speech and reason more diligcntly."·1~ Furthcrmon.:, for Cicero, oratory's civic
vocation must continue lest humans relapse to their primordial antisocial existence. Por Luther and many others, this vision of sinful yet social contributed to
his twofold realism about both human sin and God's continuing left-hand providence. The Ciceronian impulse continually nudged Luther away from the "pure
pessimism" that he surely at times exhibited. Luther, therefore, regularly cited
Psalm 127:1, which was also on his short list of verses that children should memorize,49 when espousing God's real providence mediated through a variety of
terrestrial "masks." Unsurprisingly, Luther at times interpreted these masks from
the viewpoint of oratory. 50
Especially in 011 the Best Sort ef Oratory and 011 D11ties, Cicero construed and
exercised practical reason through his oratorical imagination. Herc Cicero emphasized a third characteristic that kindled Luther's affection: the consent of the orator's audience. In the task of practical reason "[t]hc supreme orator is the one
whose speech instructs, delights, and moves the minds of his audience ... To
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move them is indispensible." 51 The orator must therefore accommodate oneself
to common idioms, customs, and speech. As Cary Nederman stresses, "whereas
in all other arts that which is most excellent is furthest removed from the understanding and mental capacity of the untutored, in oratory the very cardinal sin is
to depart from the language of everyday life and the usage approved by the sense
of the community." 52 We can see this very dynamic at work in Luther's "On
Translating," whereby the biblical translator must diligently "look the other in the
mouth." 53 This priority on the audience resonates both with Luther's "new radical reevaluation of ordinary life" 54 and with his christological accent to "'put on'
his neighbor and so conduct himself toward him as if he himself were in the
other's place."
Cicero's oratorical, discursive, communicative imagination of practical reason
is "overtly participatory" where the audience of fellow citizens is the final arbiter.
The orator thereby defers to the audience rather than commands them. 55 According to Luther's christological imagination of Christian love, we "put on" our
neighbors' circumstances and needs, and these then direct, discipline, and determine the situation-specific shape of Christian love. Luther usually reserved his
more overt participatory intuitions and insights more for his conciliar approach
to ecclesial life 56 than for his political approach to terrestrial rule. However, when
he reflected on the moral aptitudes of rulers regarding distributive justice, he
often played a participatory note.
Luther developed a suggestion first made by Augustine that Paul positioned
love as the first fruit of the Spirit because love is really the only Christian virtue
(Gal. 5:6; also Rom. 5:5; l Corinthians 13). As we "put on" our neighbors, Christian love "expands into all the fruit of the Spirit." 57 Whether the neighbor is within or without the Christian communion appears unimportant (Gal. 5:13-14; Rom.
13:8-10). Christian love operates like a pluripotent stem cell becoming-by
means of an emancipated practical reason-whatever set of virtues neighbors,
neighborhoods, and communities need for their welfare, thus setting out the
breadth of Christian vocation in God's world.

Conclusion
Luther was surely not the only one of his age to be delighted, instructed, and
moved deeply by this "wisest man." In this brief exploration we can more easily
determine the extent and depth of Luther's delight and affectedness than we can
the precise nature of the instruction that he took from Cicero. Various models of
practical reason were commonplace in Medieval and Renaissance thinkers and
numerous were delighted, instructed, and moved by Cicero.
I have suggested a Ciceronian impulse within Luther's approach to practical
reason, though he never wrote a philosophical account on the subject matter.
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Luther's metaphor of Christian love as "putting on" one's neighbors readily
opens a door for and resonates with Cicero's participatory oratorical model of
practical reason. The Ciceronian impulse also sheds light on his fnx1uent lyrical
raptures in favor of Aristotle's concept of epieikeia-the practical spirit of justice
in complexities of real life-rather than Plato's prcfcn:nce for the pure letter of
the law. Here, too, Luther regularly cites Cicero's commonplace, "More law, less
justice [more injury]" ("S111111m1111 im s11111111a i11i11n,1 est''; De r:/Jiai"., 1.10.33) in order to
insist, "therefore equity [epieikeia, Greek; aeq11itas, Latin] is necessary." 59 But such
an exploration must wait for another occasion to appraise I .uther's love affair
with this "wisest man."

